How is it that Donald Trump still commands the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of Republican office-holders and publicists? All agree that his judgment is bad, that his personality is vindictive. All—even his daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner—regularly leak to favored reporters as they have done for years that they are appalled.
And yet what Trump says goes, among Republican office holders and publicists as a group.
The furthest any but a small minority of Republican worthies will go is, I think, best exemplified by ex-Vice President Michael Pence’s declaration that he and Trump “will never see eye-to-eye” on the events of January 6, 2021, when Trump sicced a violent mob that hoped to hang Mike Pence on the Capitol, in the hope that the mob would panic the Congress and derail the certification of Joe Biden’s legitimate election victory. It did—but for less than twelve hours.
Are there useful historical analogies?
Cast yourself back into history, seeking an erratic narcissitic politician with very bad judgment, but with a strong charismatic link to a base—a link that ohters hope to benefit from and take over.
In 1958, at the Lu Mountain Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party, Marshall Peng Dehuai let the cat out of the bag: Mao Zedong’s judgment was off, he could no longer be trusted as primus inter pares. The implication was clear: time to sideline and retire Mao as soon as the grandees were confident they could do without Mao’s charismatic link to the base.
Mao struck first: the Cultural Revolution. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun purged first—with the rest of the grandees going along. Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi wind up dead. Deng Xiaoping and his supporters wind up purged. China winds up in total chaos. But the beneficiaries from the purges must be kept insecure in turn. Chen Boda purged. Lin Biao dead. Mao brings back Deng, a person with reputation and competence to run the bureaucracy, to keep insecure the radicals and beneficiaries for whom chaos has been a ladder. And Mao brings in Wong Hongwen—backed by the rest of the future Gang of Four and Kang Sheng—as a possible successor to unsettle Deng. Mao brings in Hua Guofeng as a third bowstring. Mao purges Deng again.
In this chaos the constant questions were two and only two: Was he obsequiously loyal? Was he powerless?
A “yes” to both, and he would be praised, honored, and promoted.
A “no” to either—unless he was the always-constantly-obsequiously-loyal-to-Mao Zhou Enlai—and he would be taken down a peg, or sent to work as a pipe-fitter, or wind up dead.
Always, always there were enough who saw chaos as a ladder and doing Mao’s bidding now to their advantage. Mao was dangerous to cross, had a charismatic link with a gullible base, and would not be a force for long: Mao was old, and low-energy, and rapidly on his way to meet Karl Marx.
And so it was to the end: officials falling over each other to “work towards the Chairman” even when only his nephew Mao Yuanxin and his aide Zhang Yufeng would even claim that they half-understood his grunts and scrawls. Even after Mao’s death the factions competed to show that they were the ones who had done Mao’s true bidding and won his favor: Hua Guofeng waving around the Mao quote “if you are in charge, I am at ease”, and talking about how the Cultural Revolution had been a great success and that China should look forward to more such; Wong Hengwen and the Gang-of-Four faction boasting that they were Mao’s ideological heirs; even Deng Xiaoping whispering that after his second purging he still had had Mao’s favor, and that it had been Mao via Wang Dongxing rather than Deng’s military allies who had protected him against the wrath of the Gang of Four.
Is this not the pattern of the Trump administration and post-administration (with, of course, only comparatively small-scale tortures of would-be immigrants, and only a few deaths)?
Those without power among Republicans who are sufficiently obsequious Trump promotes. Those with power among Republicans he cuts off at the knees—for he knows they have no confidence in him, and would seek to sideline them as soon as they gained control of policy levers or forged their own links to the base. And then come the denunciations from Mar-a-Lago about how all the people he hired and who worked for him in the past are losers and RINOS. Trump tells reporters that Nikki Haley asked for an audience with him, and he refused. Trump tells everyone that he is “very disappointed” in Mike Pence. And Minority Leader McConnell is “a dumb son-of-a-bitch…” The Democrats have the advantage, says Trump, because “they don't have the [Mitt] Romneys, Little Ben Sasses, and [Elizabeth] Cheneys of the world. Unfortunately, we do…. There are consequences to being ineffective and weak…”
And yet the overwhelming bulk of Republican office holders and publicists cling to Trump, hoping appeasing him will get them access to levers of power and help them forge links to the base. “Who the f— do you think you are talking to?” House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy yelled over the phone at Donald Trump as rioters broke into his office through the windows. And yet it is Kevin McCarthy who then voted to overturn Biden’s election victory by refusing to accept valid electoral votes, and later visited Mar-a-Lago to pledge fealty to Trump. After all, what harm can it do to appease Trump and do his bidding? He is dangerous to cross, has a charismatic link with a gullible base, and will not be a force for long: he is old, and low-energy, and on his way to meet Roy Cohn.
As with Mao Zedong, the odds are very high that even after Trump passes from the scene the Republican grandees will continue to compete with each other to demonstrate that they were the ones who were truly loyal to Donald J. Trump. That’s the way these things work.
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Can’t you get this in the NYT or Post?
The property of being something that cannot be questioned arises in lots of ways, and sometimes it attaches to people. Let's call this property _holy_; it's beyond regular mortal persons, and becomes facultatively axiomatic, something that cannot (at least publicly) be questioned.
Mao Zedong became holy through a combination of heroic deeds, propaganda, and the folk process.
Trump became holy through a combination of propaganda (The Apprentice is absolutely mammonite propaganda), the evangelical detachment of the habits of belief from doctrine (If a rich man cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, and you're selling prosperity gospel, you ditch the doctrine) leaving an opportunity to fixate belief, and the folk process. (Not the _same_ folk beliefs, but the same process.)
If your power comes from holiness, you prove you are holy by being something which cannot be questioned. Competence doesn't much enter into it; the social constraints do. The effective response to holiness is to survive demanding answers to questions; this is why it's important to haul Trump into a courtroom and make him answer corruption charges as any mortal must.