On Michael Mann's "On Wars"

Reviewing a book whose strengths—all of its arresting & insightful individual stories—do not really allow for fruitful summarization & lesson-drawing…

Reviewing a book whose strengths—all of its arresting & insightful individual stories—do not really allow for fruitful summarization & lesson-drawing…

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From my economist’s point of view, every single war is first and foremost a mistake.

Wars are negative-sum. Someone—possibly two someones—must have miscalculated the likely outcome in order for a war to even begin, and not halted at or before the last minute by some agreement that is, relative to the costs and hazards of war, unambiguously a win-win bargain better in expectation for both sides than the wager of the battlefield could possibly be. The aggressor should not have attacked. It should, rather, have stayed at home, cultivated its own vine and fig tree, and rested beneath them. Or, given that the aggressor was on the move, the aggressee should have struck the best bargain it could and submitted. Or perhaps both are true. But it cannot be the case, given the negative-sum nature of the activity, that neither is true.

So why do wars happen? And what, considered as a human social practice that probably excels all other human social practices in its sheer stupidity, is war?

Michael Mann’s 2023 On Wars <https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300266818/on-wars/> is profoundly thought-provoking—but not comprehensive. With such a subject, how could it be comprehensive? It is an attempt to explore the history and nature of war as an ideological, economic, political, emotional, and strictly military—whatever that could possibly be—human social practice. It tries to come to general conclusions about the underlying causes of conflicts, and thus about the potential for better achieving peace.

It fails. Much better at accomplishing the stated aims of the book, in my opinion, is Chris Blattman’s 2022 Why We Fight <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/636263/why-we-fight-by-christopher-blattman/>. Blattman’s five-item list of the types of mistakes that lead to wars—Unchecked Interest, Intangible Incentives, Uncertainty, Commitment Problems, and Misperceptions—is the foundation for a useful sociology of war in order to guide human action toward the preservation of peace. But Mann’s book is tremendously worth reading even so. For Blattman tells us very little about what war actually is. Mann, by contrast, gives us rich story after rich story, example after example.

And even though his attempts to sort them into a set of conceptual boxes—boxes from which sociological generalizations can be drawn—????largely fail, what stories!

It is the so many amazing little stories and narratives in Mann’s book that challenge readers to reconsider the complex interplay of societal forces at work in this most barbarous of human social practices. The problem is that Mann feels impelled to do more. Mann claims that as a sociologist he:

hold[s] to two methodological principles: on the one hand, the need for analytical and conceptual rigor, which is necessarily generalizing; on the other, the need to grasp empirical reality, which is inescapably varied. There is always tension…

To put it mildly. And that tension means that his hopes to come up with a generalizing sociology of the human social practice of war are all vain. But this does not mean that his writing the book was a mistake. As Lawrence Freedman writing in Foreign Affairs says that:

Mann… is not the first… to seek… a sweeping theory of war… to help foster peace. He does not realize this ambition…. But the journey is worthwhile…. He considers why societies are more or less prone to war…. He examines whether those who waged wars were really enthusiastic for the fight…. [For Mann] the trick to preventing war is to develop the social conditions that encourage restraint and diplomacy…

So ignore the frameworks and the generalizations. Read the book for the stories. And think about them.

And also read Chris Blattman’s Why We Fight. For, as I said, for what I take to be the main purpose of the book—to understand the social practice of war so that we can better attain peace—I think Mann’s book is substantially inferior to Chris Blattman’s:

• Blattman, Christopher. 2022. Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. New York: Penguin Random House. <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/636263/why-we-fight-by-christopher-blattman/>.

Blattman has a little five-part list on the causes of wars, given that he—as an economist—basically agrees with me that all wars are in a profound sense mistakes:

1. Unchecked Interests: decision-makers who can pursue war without personally feeling the destruction—and so do so for personal gain, power consolidation, or other personal benefits.

2. Intangible Incentives: because of ideology, honor, status, religion—and the pursuit of “justice”.

3. Uncertainty: because of lack of information that encourages risk-taking behavior—even though we economists say people ought to be risk averse, and so lack of information ought to lead us to hunker down, it is not so.

4. Commitment Problems: because human society’s landscapes are changing, assurances may not be credible, and negotiating stable agreements impossible.

5. Misperceptions: because human beings are prone to overconfidence bias, plus we demonize our adversaries.

But Blattman focuses on why war breaks out given its irrational strongly negative-sum nature. He has little to say about what war is. And that is where Mann excels. analysis emphasizes that these causes often interact in complex ways, compounding their effects and making wars more likely to occur. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective strategies to prevent conflict and build lasting peace.

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So what more general conclusions can we pull out of Mann’s stories? I ask these questions even though I have already said that such an approach is an unfair flattening of the book, and what I really should be saying is RTWT—Read the Whole Thing. But suppose you cannot do that. Then note that:

• Mann argues against the idea that human nature’s inherent aggressiveness drives societies to conflict.

• Mann believes in his bones that war is a social construction—a human social practice.

• And Mann believes that war is irrationally chosen by political leaders who have been shaped by their cultural and institutional environments.

• Mann meticulously analyzes wars in ancient Rome, imperial China, medieval and modern Europe, and the contemporary world.

• Mann’s stories highlight three things: all the diverse reasons groups go to war, the evolution of strategy, and all the surprising ways dominant powers falter.

• Mann’s stories highlight the irrational calculations that often underlie decisions to engage in war, for these decisions rarely achieve their intended outcomes and more often result in great destruction.

• Mann’s stories highlight that whatever elements of rational benefit-cost calculations can be found in the initiation of wars, they are overshadowed by emotions, ideologies, and social structures that push leaders toward conflict.

• Mann has a useful typology of different types of warfare—wars of aggression, defense, and mutual provocation, symmetric and asymmetric.

• Mann’s stories highlight the more-or-less complete failures of international-relations theories: none of “realism”, Marxism, liberalism, or constructivism come out well from any encounter with any actual and thickly-described war.

Perhaps the best single thread running through the stories in the book is the thread of Man plans; God laughs. The book underscores the destructive and delusional aspects of planning to achieve definite ends, and then seeking to achieve them through war​​, which almost always spirals out of control. Badly out of anyone’s control.

There are some conclusions as to how we might better guide ourselves toward peace that emerge from Mann’s book. Do not place any vain hopes Steven Pinker’s claims that humanity is becoming more “peaceful” (rather, war is becoming more organized). Commitment to international institutions of mediation and dispute-settling—with side payments—wherever you can. Create a military and political culture of self-defense in armies and polities. Avoid demonization through social contact, especially between leaders. Damp down all appeals to emotion and to justice in its “altruistic punishment” mode. Avoid groupthink. Always focus on what could go wrong. Staff your diplomatic corps and your foreign-policy advisory staff with experts on and believers in soft power.

All of these are useful.

Again: While Mann aims at a grand theory of war to foster peace, the book fails. But the book has great strengths. They lie in all of the detailed historical analyses that illuminates the complex and varied nature of the human social practice of war.

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References:

• Blattman, Christopher. 2022. Why We Fight: The Roots of War & the Paths to Peace. New York: Penguin Random House. <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/636263/why-we-fight-by-christopher-blattman/>.

• Freedman, Lawrence. 2023. “Review of On Wars, by Michael Mann”. Foreign Affairs, November/December. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2023-10-17/wars-michael-mann>

• Mann, Michael. 2023. On Wars: History & Theory. London: Verso. <https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300266818/on-wars/>.