PROJECT SYNDICATE: The Strange Death of Conservative America
Everybody should read Geoffrey Kabaservice's 2012 book, Rule & Ruin!
J. Bradford DeLong: The Strange Death of Conservative America: American conservatives once sought to ride the waves of markets and innovation toward ever-greater wealth and prosperity, but now they cower in fear. And, as the trajectory of today’s Republican Party shows, that makes them a threat to democracy.
BERKELEY – If you are concerned about the well-being of the United States and interested in what the country could do to help itself, stop what you are doing and read historian Geoffrey Kabaservice’s superb 2012 book, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/rule-and-ruin-9780199768400?cc=us&lang=en&>. To understand why, allow me a brief historical interlude.
Until roughly the start of the seventeenth century, people generally had to look back in time to find evidence of human greatness. Humanity had reached its peak in long lost golden ages of demigods, great thinkers, and massive construction projects. When people did look to the future for promise of a better world, it was a religious vision they conjured – a city of God, not of man. When they looked to their own society, they saw that it was mostly the same as in the past, with Henry VIII and his retinue holding court in much the same fashion as Agamemnon, or Tiberius Caesar, or Arthur.
But then, around 1600, some people in Western Europe noticed <https://archive.org/details/idealcommonwealt00more> that history was moving largely in one particular direction, owing to the expansion of humankind’s technological capabilities. In response to seventeenth-century Europeans’ new doctrine of progress, conservative forces have represented one widely subscribed view of how societies should respond to the political implications of technological and social change. In doing so, they have generally gathered themselves into four different kinds of political parties.
The first comprises reactionaries: those who simply want to stand “athwart history, yelling ‘STOP,’” as William F. Buckley, Jr. famously put it. Reactionaries consider themselves to be at war <https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/the-flight-93-election/> with a dystopian “armed doctrine” with which compromise is neither possible nor desirable. In the fight against this foe, no alliance should be rejected, even if it is with factions that would otherwise be judged evil or contemptible.
The second kind of party favors “Whig measures and Tory men” <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2007/07/whig-measures-and-tory-men/43273/>. These conservatives can see that technological and social change might be turned to human advantage, provided that the changes are guided by leaders with a keen appreciation of the value of our historical patrimony and of the dangers of destroying existing institutions before building new ones. As Tancredi explains to his uncle, the Prince of Salina, in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s The Leopard <https://archive.org/details/leopard00lamp>, “If we want things to stay the same, things will have to change.”
The third type of conservative party is found primarily (but not exclusively) in America. It emerges as an adaptation to a society that sees itself as overwhelmingly new and liberal. It is not a party of tradition and inherited status, but rather of wealth and business. In its ranks are conservatives who want to remove government-imposed hurdles to technological innovation, entrepreneurship, and enterprise. Confident that the free market holds the key to generating wealth and prosperity, they breathlessly tout the merits of surfing its waves of Schumpeterian creative destruction.
Fourth and last, there is the home of the fearful and the grifters who exploit them. This constituency includes all those who believe it is they who will be creatively destroyed by the processes of historical change. They feel (or are led to believe) that they are beset on all sides by internal and external enemies who are more powerful than they are and eager to “replace” or “cancel” them.
What I have learned from Harvard University political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s 2018 bestseller, How Democracies Die <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/>, is that democratic countries can be governed well only if their conservative parties fall into the second or third of the four categories above. When conservatives coalesce around reaction or fear, democratic institutions come under threat.
Levitsky and Ziblatt offer many examples to demonstrate this, but let me add one more. A little over a century ago, Great Britain experienced an astonishingly rapid decline from its position as the world’s political and economic hyper-power. This process was accelerated significantly by the transformation of its Tory Party into a party combining types one and four. This was the party of Mafeking Night (Boer War) celebrations and armed resistance to Irish constitutional reform. In the 1910–14 period, George Dangerfield later recalled, the world witnessed the “Strange Death of liberal England” <https://archive.org/details/strangedeathofli00dang>.
That brings us back to Kabaservice’s book, which tells the story of how the US Republican Party put itself on an analogous course. When I look out at the current political scene, I see very few elements of categories two and three in the Republican Party. And any that are left are fast disappearing.
Republican politicians today are desperate to pick up the mantle of Donald Trump, undoubtedly one of the worst presidents in American history. Obviously, this dangerous and embarrassing trend needs to be reversed as rapidly and as completely as possible. But I, for one, am at a loss to see how that might be done.
LINK TO DRAFT:
Britain may have lost its liberalism in the first decades of the 20th century, but a depression and 2 world wars changed that. After WWII, Britain was pushing its technology and by the 1960s, as in the US, the population and its leadership was much more progressive. I don't sense that the Tory party became types 1 or 4 even during the Thatchter decade and beyond.
So perhaps the solution is a serious conflict - say with China - that alters attitudes and sweeps away the reactionary forces in the Republican Party? That isn't to be wished for.
I am reminded that most STEM academics and engineers were Republican during and after WII. The country started to shed its conservatism after WWII, and it seems to me that the threat of Russia after Sputnik ensured that the country became much more focused on science and engineering. As elsewhere, the country became much more liberal. It was Reaganism in the 1980s that seems to have pushed the country (as in the UK) back towards a conservatism that was much more reactionary.
The UK, unlike the US, does not seem to have a declining Tory population., Despite playing into the culture wars (albeit not as deeply as in the US), Britain's nativists are not apparently such a minority as in the US. I don't get the sense that the racial US vs THEM is as strong in the UK. Maybe it is the ingrained British politeness that hides it.
My suggestion is that the US needs a shock to the system to turn around the Republicans. A shock that forces a facing of reality, "marking to market" the US competency to win - technologically or militarily. It won't need a shooting war, but perhaps a massive cyberattack that brings the country to its knees until computer systems are hardened more seriously against such an attack. Or perhaps the Chinese demonstrating technological superiority by building a moon base, or setting foot on Mars first, eclipsing the US efforts. Or perhaps a small shooting war where China captures Taiwan and leaves the US defeated in the western Pacific - a bloody nose might be sufficient to humiliate the US. (Apart from Gulf War I, the US seems to have done badly when actually fighting asymmetric wars, spending blood and treasure for no gain), a pattern of failure experienced by Britain as it tried to remain a global policeman after WWII but failed.
Thanks for bringing the Kabaservice book to my attention. I'm only through the first couple of chapters but the authoritarian and undemocratic character of movement conservatism was clear as long ago as sixty years ago.