READING: Perhaps þe Most Remarkable Description of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, & Its Aftermath, Ever
Sir Arthur Lyon Freemantle (1835-1901), Captain in the Coldstream Guards and Lieutenant Colonel in Her Majesty's army...
James Fremantle: The Fremantle Diary: A Journal of the Confederacy: ‘At noon [on July 3] all Longstreet’s dispositions were made. His troops for attack were deployed into line, and lying down in the woods; his batteries were ready to open. The general then dismounted and went to sleep for a short time. The Austrian officer and I now rode off to get, if possible, into some commanding position from whence we could see the whole thing without being exposed to the tremendous fire which was about to commence…. Just before we reached the entrance to the town, the cannonade opened with a fury which surpassed even that of yesterday….
Finding that, to see the actual fighting, it was absolutely necessary to go into the thick of the thing, I determined to make my way to General Longstreet. It was then about 2:30…. I soon began to meet many wounded men returning from the front. Many of them asked in piteous tones the way to a doctor or an ambulance. The further I got, the greater became the number of the wounded. At last I came to a perfect stream of them flocking through the woods in numbers as great as the crowd in Oxford Street in the middle of the day. Some were walking alone on crutches composed of two rifles, others were supported by men less badly wounded than themselves, and others were carried on stretchers by the ambulance corps; but in no case did I see a sound man helping the wounded to the rear, unless he carried the red badge of the ambulance corps. They were still under a heavy fire; the shells were continually bringing down great limbs of trees, and carrying further destruction amongst this melancholy procession. I saw all this in much less time than it takes to write it, and although astonished to meet such vast numbers of wounded, I had not seen enough to give me any idea of the real extent of the mischief.
When I got close up to General Longstreet, I saw one of his regiments advancing through the woods in good order; so, thinking I was just in time to see the attack, I remarked to the General that “I wouldn’t have missed this for anything.” Longstreet was seated at the top of a snake fence at the edge of the wood, and looking perfectly calm and imperturbed.
He replied, laughing, “The devil you wouldn’t! I would like to have missed it very much; we’ve attacked and been repulsed: look there!”
For the first time I then had a view of the open space between the two positions, and saw it covered with Confederates slowly and sulkily returning towards us in small broken parties, under a heavy fire of artillery. But the fire where we were was not so bad as further to the rear: for although the air seemed alive with shell, yet the greater number burst behind us.
The General told me that Pickett’s division had succeeded in carrying the enemy’s position and capturing his guns, but after remaining there twenty minutes, it had been forced to retire, on the retreat of Heth and Pettigrew on its left. No person could have been more calm or self-possessed than General Longstreet under these trying circumstances, aggravated as they now were by the movements of the enemy, who began to show a strong disposition to advance. I could now thoroughly appreciate the term bulldog, which I had heard applied to him by the soldiers. Difficulties seem to make no other impression upon him than to make him a little more savage…. The General was making the best arrangements in his power to resist the threatened advance, by advancing some artillery, rallying the stragglers, &c. I remember seeing a General (Pettigrew, I think it was) come up to him, and report that “he was unable to bring his men up again.” Longstreet turned upon him and replied with some sarcasm: “Very well; never mind, then, General; just let them remain where they are: the enemy’s going to advance, and will spare you the trouble.” He asked for something to drink. I gave him some rum out of my silver flask, which I begged he would keep in remembrance of the occasion; he smiled, and, to my great satisfaction, accepted the memorial….
If Longstreet’s conduct was admirable, that of General Lee was perfectly sublime. He was engaged in rallying and in encouraging the broken troops, and was riding about a little in front of the wood, quite alone—the whole of his staff being engaged in a similar manner further to the rear. His face, which is always placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance; and he was addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement, such as, “All this will come right in the end; we’ll talk it over afterwards; but, in the meantime, all good men must rally. We want all good and true men just now,” &c. He spoke to all the wounded men that passed him, and the slightly wounded he exhorted “to bind up [their] hurts and take up a musket” in this emergency. Very few failed to answer his appeal, and I saw many badly wounded men take off their hats and cheer him. He said to me, “This has been a sad day for us, Colonel—a sad day; but we can’t expect always to gain victories.”…
I saw General Willcox (an officer who wears a short round jacket and a battered straw hat) come up to him, and explain, almost crying, the state of his brigade. General Lee immediately shook hands with him and said cheerfully, “Never mind, General, all this has been MY fault—it is I that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can.” In this manner I saw General Lee encourage and reanimate his somewhat dispirited troops, and magnanimously take upon his own shoulders the whole weight of the repulse. It was impossible to look at him or to listen to him without feeling the strongest admiration….
The men, as they were rallied in the wood, were brought up in detachments, and lay down quietly and coolly in the positions assigned to them. We heard that Generals Garnett and Armistead were killed, and General Kemper mortally wounded; also, that Pickett’s division had only one field officer unhurt. Nearly all this slaughter took place in an open space about one mile square, and within one hour….
I was immediately surrounded by a sergeant and about half-a-dozen gunners, who seemed in excellent spirits and full of confidence, in spite of their exposed situation. The sergeant expressed his ardent hope that the Yankees might have spirit enough to advance and receive the dose he had in readiness for them. They spoke in admiration of the advance of Pickett’s division, and of the manner in which Pickett himself had led it. When they observed General Lee they said, “We’ve not lost confidence in the old man: this day’s work won’t do him no harm. ‘Uncle Robert’ will get us into Washington yet; you bet he will!” &c….
4th July (Saturday)—…I walked up to the front about eight o’clock, and on our way we met General Longstreet, who was in a high state of amusement and good humor. A flag of truce had just come over from the enemy, and its bearer announced among other things that “General Longstreet was wounded, and a prisoner, but would be taken care of.” General Longstreet sent back word that he was extremely grateful, but that, being neither wounded nor a prisoner, he was quite able to take care of himself. The iron endurance of General Longstreet is most extraordinary. He seems to require neither food nor sleep. Most of his staff now fall fast asleep directly they get off their horses, they are so exhausted from the last three days’ work….
At 10 A.M. Lawley returned from headquarters, bringing the news that the army is to commence moving in the direction of Virginia this evening. This step is imperative from want of ammunition. But it was hoped that the enemy might attack during the day, especially as this is the Fourth of July, and it was calculated that there was still ammunition for one day’s fighting. The ordnance train had already commenced moving back towards Cashtown, and Ewell’s immense train of plunder had been proceeding towards Hagerstown by the Fairfield road ever since an early hour this morning….
At 2 P.M. we walked to General Longstreet’s camp…. General Longstreet talked to me for a long time about the battle. He said the mistake they had made was in not concentrating the army more, and in failing to make the attack yesterday with 30,000 men instead of 15,000. The advance had been in three lines, and the troops of Hill’s corps who gave way were young soldiers, who had never been under fire before. He thought the enemy would have attacked had the guns been withdrawn. Had they done so at that particular moment immediately after the repulse, it would have been awkward; but in that case he had given orders for the advance of Hood’s division and M’Laws’s on the right. I think, after all, that General Meade was right not to advance—his men would never have stood the tremendous fire of artillery they would have been exposed to.
Rather over 7000 Yankees were captured during the three days [of the battle]; 3500 took the parole; the remainder were now being marched to Richmond, escorted by the remains of Pickett’s division. It is impossible to avoid seeing that the cause of this check to the Confederates lies in the utter contempt felt for the enemy by all ranks. Wagons, horses, mules, and cattle captured in Pennsylvania, the solid advantages of this campaign, have been passing slowly along this road (Fairfield) all day. Those taken by Ewell are particularly admired. So interminable was this train that it soon became evident that we should not be able to start till late at night.
As soon as it became dark we all lay round a big fire, and I heard reports coming in from the different generals that the enemy was retiring, and had been doing so all day long. M’Laws reported nothing in his front but cavalry vedettes. But this, of course, could make no difference to General Lee’s plan: ammunition he must have—he had failed to capture it from the enemy (according to precedent); and as his communications with Virginia were intercepted, he was compelled to fall back towards Winchester, and draw his supplies from thence. General Milroy had kindly left an ample stock at that town when he made his precipitate exit some weeks ago. The army was also incumbered with an enormous wagon train, the spoils of Pennsylvania, which it is highly desirable to get safely over the Potomac….
9th July (Thursday)—…Passing beyond the Confederate Lines…. At length they allowed me to proceed, on the understanding that my buggy driver should hand me over to General Kelly…. The hills near Hancock were white with Yankee tents, and there were, I believe, from 8000 to 10,000 Federals there. I did not think much of the appearance of the Northern troops. They are certainly dressed in proper uniform, but their clothes are badly fitted, and they are often round-shouldered, dirty, and slovenly in appearance; in fact, bad imitations of soldiers. Now, the Confederate has no ambition to imitate the regular soldier at all. He looks the genuine Rebel; but in spite of his bare feet, his ragged clothes, his old rug, and toothbrush stuck like a rose in his buttonhole, he has a sort of devil-may-care, reckless, self-confident look, which is decidedly taking….
11th July (Saturday)—I hope I may never for my sins be again condemned to travel for thirty hours in an American stage…. My fellow travelers were of course violent Unionists, and… had all got into their heads that their Potomac army, not having been thoroughly thrashed, as it always has been hitherto, had achieved a tremendous victory; and that its new chief, General Meade, who in reality was driven into a strong position, which he had sense enough to stick to, is a wonderful strategist. They all hope that the remnants of Lee’s army will not be allowed to ESCAPE over the Potomac; whereas, when I left the army two days ago, no man in it had a thought of escaping over the Potomac, and certainly General Meade was not in a position to attempt to prevent the passage, if crossing had become necessary….
14th July (Tuesday)—…I heard everyone talking of the total demoralization of the Rebels as a certain fact, and all seemed to anticipate their approaching destruction. All this sounded very absurd to me, who had left Lee’s army four days previously as full of fight as ever—much stronger in numbers, and ten times more efficient in every military point of view, than it was when it crossed the Potomac to invade Maryland a year ago. In its own opinion, Lee’s army has not lost any of its prestige at the battle of Gettysburg, in which it most gallantly stormed strong intrenchments defended by the whole army of the Potomac, which never ventured outside its works, or approached in force within half a mile of the Confederate artillery…. I was filled with astonishment to hear the people speaking in this confident manner, when one of their most prosperous states had been so recently laid under contribution as far as Harrisburg; and Washington, their capital itself, having just been saved by a fortunate turn of luck. Four-fifths of the Pennsylvanian spoil had safely crossed the Potomac before I left Hagerstown….
Postscript—…It is the opinion of the Confederates that they can keep their armies recruited up to their present strength for several years; and, if the worst comes to the worst, they can always fall back upon their Negroes as the last resort…. With respect to the supply of arms, cannon, powder, and military stores, the Confederates are under no alarm whatever. Augusta furnishes more than sufficient gunpowder; Atlanta, copper caps, &c. The Tredegar Works at Richmond, and other foundries, cast more cannon than is wanted; and the Federal generals have always hitherto proved themselves the most indefatigable purveyors of artillery to the Confederate government. Even in those actions which they claim as drawn battles or as victories, such as Corinth, Murfreesboro, and Gettysburg, they have never failed to make over cannon to the Southerners without exacting any in return….
My Northern friends… spoke much and earnestly about the determination of the North to crush out the Rebellion at any sacrifice. But they did not show any disposition to fight themselves in this cause, although many of them would have made most eligible recruits; and if they had been Southerners, their female relations would have made them enter the army whether their inclinations led them that way or not….
The mass of respectable Northerners, though they may be willing to pay, do not very naturally feel themselves called upon to give their blood in a war of aggression, ambition, and conquest. For this war is essentially a war of conquest…. The more I think of all that I have seen in the Confederate States of the devotion of the whole population, the more I feel inclined to say with General Polk—“How can you subdue such a nation as this!” Even supposing that their extermination were a feasible plan, as some Northerners have suggested, I never can believe that in the nineteenth century the civilized world will be condemned to witness the destruction of such a gallant race…
LINK: <https://archive.org/details/fremantlediarybe0000frem>
If Col. Fremantle's analysis was so on point, then why did the CSA literally melt away less than two years later? Also, in what parallel universe did the wise Col. expect the enslaved Black population to willingly spill their blood for their tormentors? Would the good Col. have done that if the tables were turned?
Although Gettysburg was not the battle that ended the "slavocracy," much more blood still had to be shed, it did prove a number of things: Lee was foolish to recklessly attempt such a "large-scale raid" in the face of overwhelming Union superiority; Lee's goal of spreading the pain of the war onto the Pennsylvania countryside was easily absorbed and countered; and while Lee was enjoying himself with delusions of grandeur, Grant was effectively "eating his lunch" in the West and splitting the Confederacy in two!
The Anaconda Plan, devised by Winfield Scott and embraced by Pres. Lincoln, did exactly what it set out to do - it squeezed the life out of the "slavocracy" and tried to avoid an horrendous war of attrition to be fought by the Union.
Lee was a "showboater," like many other Southern cavaliers. Unfortunately, the war's beneficient political outcome was fritters away in the stupid compromise of 1876-1877, which ended Reconstruction and demolished the possibility of a true American democracy.
Sheldon Teicher
Chivalry vs. industry. No contest.