"Ser Nihilo" & Ser Niccolò in France: Machiavelli, Broke & Un-Listened to at the French Court of Louis XII

The Renaissance city-state of Florence sends a junior diplomat to try to fix the diplomatic consequences of a military disaster. And doesn’t fund him. Nobody listens. Machiavelli in the diplomatic...

The Renaissance city-state of Florence sends a junior diplomat to try to fix the diplomatic consequences of a military disaster. And doesn’t fund him. Nobody listens. Machiavelli in the diplomatic trenches, thirteen years before The Prince. Between unpaid mercenaries, snubbed at audiences, and court contempt, the youngish Niccolò Machiavelli learns the cost of weak states and weaker instructions…

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Sent to explain away Florence’s role in the military disaster at Pisa, Machiavelli is sent with no plan, little pay—half the pay of his partner—and instructions both so vague and so micromanaged they bordered on sabotage. The court of French King Louis XII would not take this jumped-up clerk seriously: they offered gave him contempt. But what Machiavelli observed in failure would help shape one of the most original minds in political thought. A glimpse of Renaissance geopolitics and a cold-bath awakening to realpolitik.

Letters Patent:

PRO NICOLAO MACHIAVELLO ET FRANCISCO DELLA CASA, AD CHRISTIANISSIMAM REGIAM MAJESTATEM:

17 July 1500:

In sending at the present time, on account of certain important matters of ours, our respectable and most valued citizens Francesco della Casa and Niccolo Machiavelli to the court of the Most Christian King [Louis XII Valois of France], we beg the friends, confederates, and wellwishers of our republic, and command our subjects, that both in going and returning you will receive them with all their servants, goods, and equipage, and treat them in the most friendly manner everywhere within your dominion, without payment of any tolls or taxes. And in case they should require any guides, escorts, or any other favors for their safe conveyance to where they wish to go, we pray you promptly to comply with their requests. Your doing so will be appreciated by us in the highest degree, and in similar or more important occasions we offer you the same service at your good will and pleasure…

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In 1500, the ruling executive—the Signoria—of the city-state Republic of Florence sent one Niccolò Machiavelli and one Francesco della Cas on a Mission to the Court of France, that kingdom being then ruled by Louis XII Valois:

You will proceed with all possible despatch, even to riding post, if your strength permits it, to Lyons, or wherever you learn that his most Christian Majesty is to be found. Upon arrival, you will at once call upon our ambassadors there, Messers Francesco Gualterotti and Lorenzo Lenzi, and communicate to them our present instructions, and confer with them as to whether there is anything to be added or left out; also as to your mode of proceeding in urging one thing more than another.

You will then present yourselves, together with our ambassadors, before his Majesty, the king, and, after the customary formalities of the first audience, you will expose to him in our name the substance of the instructions you will receive from us; although we do not believe that we can give you more clear and positive information than what you already possess touching the events of which you have yourselves been witnesses, and in connection with which you were in great part the agents and executors of all that had to be done on our part…

These do not seem friendly instructions—the undertone seems to me to be thus: Things went wrong with respect to the siege of Pisa, and someone shit the bed. You were there. In fact, you were more than there: you were our “agents and executors” as the bed-shitting took place. Now go explain to the King Louis XII Valois of France the state of the bed, and why he should not blame Florence for it.

And then the real high-status Ambassador, Lorenzo Lenzi appears to have taken a look at the situation and skipped town—ignoring the instructions of the Signoria that he accompany them to their audiences with Louis XII. For we have:

Instructions:

GIVEN TO FRANCESCO DELLA CASA AND NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI BY LORENZO LENZI, AMBASSADOR, ETC., ETC.:

In consequence of the absence of Messer Francesco Gualterotti, and the departure of the king from here, I shall not be able to present you to his Majesty, and therefore deem it necessary to give you the following instructions, namely : —…

God! These are long:

…You will follow the cour… present yourselves to the Cardinal d'Amboise… [say you are] to… explain… [what] occurred… before Pisa; but that before doing so you desire to render a full and particular account… to his Eminence, so that you may afterwards communicate [to others] so much of it … as his Eminence may deem proper… [and] follow his advice in all things, inasmuch as our republic looks upon his Eminence as her chief protector and benefactor…. Do all that can be done to preserve his favorable disposition towards our republic, and to derive from it all the advantages possible….

Avoid as much as possible laying the blame upon M. de Beaumont…. You may say that… he always manifested the greatest anxiety and displeasure at seeing things go as they did, to our disadvantage and to the discredit of his Majesty; and that… he never relaxed his efforts nor his diligence; and that the malignity of others was the sole cause of all the disorders… envy and bad conduct of those Italians… whom you may blame…. Do not fail to testify to the good conduct of Saliente…. If his Eminence… should say… that M. de Beaumont had been appointed… at the request of Piero Soderini… admit that you have heard that this was so….

You will add that you have heard that… his Majesty is disposed to persevere in carrying on the war against the Pisans…. You must also ask his Majesty to allow Giovanni Bentivogli to come to our aid… he being animated by the desire to do so in honor of his Majesty and for our benefit… [but he] deems it his duty to do nothing without his Majesty's consent.

The persons upon whose influence with his Most Christian Majesty we can most depend are… the Cardinal d'Amboise, Monseigneur d'Alby, — in fact, I may say the whole house of Amboise; the Maréchal de Gies, and Monseigneur General Robertet, whom you will see as often as you can, and let him see that you have full faith in him…. I had forgotten to name the Grand Chancellor, who… yet is our friend…. Show equal confidence to Messer Jacopo da Trivulzi…. The same with Ligny….

Do not dispute upon any of the points on which you see that his Eminence has formed a definite judgment; and when you find him decided upon any particular course, approve all he has done, for the power and good will of the king of France will make up for all that we might lack. And do not fail to say to the Cardinal d'Amboise that the report which has been made to him in relation to the conduct of the Lucchese may be the result of igorance of the individual who made it, or he may have been influenced by some other motive. Nevertheless, after you have done all you can in the matter, you must conform to the will of his Eminence…

I must say, had I been Niccolò Machiavelli, and had I been given such micromanaging instructions, I would have retired forthwith, and spent the rest of my life pruning trees. In those days of troubled communications and along travel times, an ambassador needs a briefing and needs confidence that his bosses understand that he will do his best.

But such was not the case in the snakepit that was the Signoria of the early-1500s Republic of Florence and its servants. Machiavelli (and della Casa) would seem to have had their work cut out for them.

We have Letter I back to Florence written from Lyons in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes on July 28, 1500, saying that Machiavelli and della Casa have arrived, but Louis XII Valois has left, and they will be in hot pursuit tomorrow…

We have Letter II back to Florence written from Lyons on July 29, 1500, expressing disturbance that the Signoria has perhaps not been listening to its ambassadors Francesco Gualterotti and Lorenzo Lenzi as it perhaps should have, that Machiavelli and della Casa will soldier on and carry out their embassy without Lenzi, and that although in hot pursuit:

[We] arrived her a little later perhaps than your Lordships could have desired. The cause of the delay was an unforeseen accident, which obliged us to stop on the road…. We leave here positively to-morrow to follow the court [of King Louis XII Valois of France]; we have been obliged to defer our departure in consequence of our having arrived here denuded of everything, and having to procure at the same time horses, wearing apparel, and servants.

All this has become very difficult because of the recent departure of the court; they having stripped the whole country around of all means of travel and transport. Thus the small compensation which we receive, and the heavy expenses to which we are subjected with little prospect of being reimbursed, cause us no little anxiety. But we have every degree of confidence in your Lordships' discretion and kindness…. Lorenzo Lenzi is, to our great regret, positively determined not to follow the court, but to return to Florence…

We have Letter III on July 30 stating:

At this very moment, it being the twenty-first hour, we are about to leave for the court; so that we may communicate to his Majesty the king the object of the mission. We shall endeavor with the utmost celerity to make up for the time which we were unavoidably obliged to lose in putting ourselves in the proper condition, and to supply ourselves with all the necessaries for the purpose of proceeding, which involved many difficulties and much expense, as already stated in the enclosed. It remains for us now most respectfully to remind your Lordships that it may readily happen that we shall have to despatch special couriers to you for matters of great importance; but which we shall not be able to do, being without money or credit…

And Letters IV and 5 from 50 miles north-northwest of Lyons on August 5:

Your Lordships know what salary was assigned to me on our departure from Florence, and also the amount accorded to Francesco della Casa. Doubtless this was done under the belief that in the natural course of things I would have occasion to spend less money than Francesco. Such however has not been the case; for not finding his Most Christian Majesty at obliged me to incur the same expenses as Francesco. It seems to me, therefore, beyond all human and divine reason that I should not have the same emoluments. If the expenses which I incur seem to your Lordships too great… I beg your Lordships to recall me; but if it be not so, then 1 trust your Lordships will take such measures that I may not ruin myself…

Plus:

We left Lyons on the 30th ultimo… with all the speed that our wretched horses would permit, having been obliged to buy such as we could get… We should have succeeded in overtaking the court, had it not been that his Majesty has travelled more rapidly… varied his route because of the sickness… so… where we attempted to take a shorter and more direct road… we have actually gone further away…. [We are now] five leagues from Nevers, where we were told we should find the king, so that we hope confidently to overtake his Majesty to-morrow…. [As] soon as we shall have been able to do this, we shall immediately notify your Lordships… [by] letter to Rinieri Dei at Lyons, for which we shall pay with what little money may remain in our purse; for the sum you have given us… pay[s] only about two-thirds of the expenses which we have incurred thus far…

Letters VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X are sent from Montargis in Centre-Val de Loire, about halfway from between in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté and Paris itself, near the Château de Fontainebleau, between August 10 and August 14.

They have caught up with King Louis XII, having continued their quest “in disregard of all fatigue and fear of the sickness which prevails in this country”. They complain that it would have been good had the Signoria given them a letter to the Cardinal d’Amboise. They report that the Cardinal said that there was no point in looking backwards to assign blame for the defeat before Pisa, and that the important thing was to decide on what to do going forward. They report that they have had their first audience with King Louis, and explained to him that the defeat was not the fault of the Signoria of Florence, but rather of the:

departure from camp of the Gascons, the outrages of the Swiss, and the carrying off of our commissioner, and to the constant parleying of the French commander with the enemy… the insulting manner in which your Lordships and all the Florentines had been spoken of, and how all this had inspired the Pisans with fresh courage…. It did not seem to us advisable, notwithstanding your orders upon this point, specially to accuse any Italians… [for] we thought that such a public accusation would be likely to make us more enemies, rather than prove of advantage…

And they assure the Signoria that they successfully threaded the needle: “satisfying the Cardinal, to whom we knew that what we had said of Beaumont would be most agreeable, and at the same time not contradicting the king's conclusions as to want of discipline” in the French army before Pisa.

To which King Louis responded that “the Swiss were in the habit of acting thus, and of practising similar extortions… that his troops had not done their duty, but that there had been equal remissness on our [Florentine] part…” And then King Louis put them on the spot: demanding that they propose a plan, when they had been given no instructions with respect to that matter but told only to deflect blame with respect to Pisa: “We suggested that we should receive within a very few days a reply from your Lordships to his Majesty's letter, whereupon the king said, that without such a reply and a definite decision on your part it would be impossible to proceed any further in this matter; and that it was important that your Lordships should decide at once…”

And inside these letters are occasional asides about how:

at our departure from Florence, your Lordships assigned to Francesco della Casa eight lire per day, and only four lire to me. I doubt not that your Lordships had good reasons for doing so, but that you did not suppose that things would happen as they have done…

Plus recommendations about how the mood of King Louis and, indeed, the entire French court:

depends entirely upon the reports made [back to the king] by the captains [commanding the French army units]; so that it is of the utmost importance to dispose these officers favorably to your Lordships…

which I take to mean: “bribe them!”

Plus Machiavelli writes that he did not dare raise the issue that the mercenaries in the French forces in Italy had not been paid:

We did not deem it well to speak to his Eminence in relation to the pay of the artillery and of the Swiss, nor did he ever say anything to us about it; but the very first time that he mentions these matters, which we believe will be very soon, we shall reply in accordance with your Lordships' latest instructions…

And he assures the Signoria that even though the purpose of the sending of the embassy has turned out to be moot, it will not be totally wasted:

Although it may seem presumptuous for us to speak of matters here, having but so recently come here, yet we shall write to your Lordships all we can learn…

with respect to court gossip and likely French policy. But they end with the admission that although the Florentine reply to King Louis was received, they have had no opportunity to present it to him, as King Louis is recuperating from a hunting accident: the King’s horse fell on him and sprained the King’s shoulder.

Letter XI reports that the Cardinal d’Amboise is holding Florence’s feet to the fire:

His Eminence interrupted our remarks abruptly, and said: "Yes, we have heard everything, and, by my faith, until now I have always done you all the good I possibly could; but now, since your conduct is so bad, I really know not what more to do for you; and his Majesty thinks it very strange that he should be obliged to pay the Swiss for your Lordships[’ sake]..." We replied… that our republic had always done her duty in all respects; and that the refusal to resume the war against Pisa resulted from the impossibility of doing so, to which the republic found herself reduced…. Of the payment of the Swiss… [we] said that this matter might be adjusted in a reasonable manner, if his Eminence would favor us with his aid and advice…

And Machiavelli reports that they are attempting to get justice from the King for Florentine merchant Bartolommeo Ginori, who had been robbed by the lancers commanded by French aristocrat Louis de Luxembourg, then Comte de Ligny.

By Letter XII Machiavelli is trying to tell the Signoria that their view of their ally France is delusional:

Your Lordships ought to… [pay] the Swiss, or… defend yourselves against the anger which his Majesty will feel against you… which… will increase of itself, and… [be] fomented… by your enemies…. Well-digested letters or arguments will [not] be of service… for they are not cven listened to. It is idle to recall to the French here the good faith with which our republic has always acted towards the crown of France… or the large sums of money which we have spent and the dangers we have borne on their account, and how many times we have in return been fed by them with vain hopes… and… the ruinous damage which our republic suffered in consequence; or what his Majesty might still count upon from you if you were strong….

They hold a very different language about all these things from what you do, and view them with another eye altogether from that of persons who are not of this court; for they are blinded by their power and their immediate advantage, and have considcration only for those who are either well armed, or who are prepared to pay…. They imagine you lacking both…. They call you Ser Nihilo (Signor Nothing), and baptize your inability discord amongst yourselves; and the ill conduct of their troops they ascribe to your bad government…. Our mission here is evidently not agreeable to them, and our rank and quality insufficient…. If your Lordships really desire to maintain your relations with this court, then we deem it absolutely indispensable for you to send fresh [and higher rank] ambassadors here…”

for now, apparently, both Francesco Gualterotti and Lorenzo Lenzi have absented themselves without leave.

Letters XIII, XIV, and XV were despatched on September 4. The begging for money gets really intense. As does the warning that the French no longer regard Florence as an ally:

Corcou… concluded that you must either pay back to his Majesty the thirty-eight thousand francs which he has disbursed on your account, or have him for your enemy forever. And although we said all we could, — that this was unreasonable, and that it would be useless to write this to your Lordships, - yet he remained firm in his Corcou, and he concluded that you must either pay back to his Majesty the thirty-eight thousand francs which he has disbursed on your account, or have him for your enemy forever. And although we said all we could, — that this was unreasonable, and that it would be useless to write this to your Lordships, - yet he remained firm…

and so:

Since his Majesty's dissatisfaction with you has become manifest, you have scarcely a single friend left, but everybody seeks to injure your cause…. If your Lordships do not take measures to correct [matters], you will find yourselves very soon in such a position with regard to the king, that you will have to think more of protecting and defending your possessions, and even your personal liberty, than of recovering the territory you have lost. This state of things has been made known to us, amongst others, by Robertet, who is the only person that has remained our friend; but we shall lose him too very soon, unless we sustain his friendship with something more substantial than words…

Letters XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, and XXIII take us up to October 23, by which time the court had moved on to the city of Blois on the Loire and then to Nantes in Brittany. Francesco della Casa has dropped out of the picture. Machiavelli himself repeatedly begs—so that he “do[es] not hesitate to weary your Lordships with the same story by every messenger… with even increased energy… see[ing] your enemies every day inventing some new schemes for their own advantage”—for money for himself, more senior ambassadors of aristocratic note to assure the French aristocrats that Florence is not dissing them by requiring them to talk to middle-class clerks like Machiavelli, and for the Signoria to do something to appease the French who are not, it seems, over their anger at the defeat at the siege of Pisa. And he sees a glimmer of dawn in his last letter, having learned that the real high-status Florentine ambassador, Pier Francesco Tosinghi, has been nominated and is on the way.

In Letter XXIV Machiavelli begs to be allowed to come home, as he will shortly be completely superfluous with the arrival of Pier Francesco Tosinghi. Silence in reply.

In Letter XXV he complain about missing dispatches, and later dispatches not giving enough of a summary of earlier ones. Machiavelli has guessed at what the missing dispatch contains—a request that he seek military protection for Florence from the Pope’s son Cesare Borgia, who has just conquered Faena, given the flying “rumors… as to the evil disposition of [his] army… towards your Lordships…”. So he sought aid. And this was Cardinal d’Amboise’s reply:

He replied that he did not believe that the Pope would attempt to engage in any enterprise in Italy, without first conferring with his Majesty the king on the subject; and as he had not done so, he did not think the Pope would make any such attempt…. He reflected a moment, and then said, “Preserve the friendship of the king, and then you will not need his assistance; but if you lose his good graces, all the help will not suffice you…”

And the Cardinal then went on to:

speak of all the trouble he had taken for your Lordships' benefit, and of the dishonor to which the king had been subjected from his affection for you; but that you had broken the treaties by refusing to pay the money due by you to the Swiss, etc.; and that now, being afraid of the Pope, you claimed the aid and support of the king, which his Majesty, however, would not grant unless it was clearly understood whether or not you intended to remain his friends. For to write anything in your favor would be acting adversely to the people of Lucca, Sienna, and your other enemies, whom his Majesty did not want to become his enemies when your Lordships ceased to be his friends…

And, after 28 letters, on December 12, 1500, Machiavelli is released from duty:

THE MAGISTRACY OF THE TEN TO FRANCESCO DELLA CASA AND NICOLO MACHIAVELLI. SPECTABILES VIRI, ETC.: -

As we have promised you several times that upon the arrival of our ambassador at court we would give you leave to return here, we have this day passed a resolution to that effect, inasmuch as two days since we had letters from our ambassador, dated the last day of November, announcing his arrival. And having replied to him and instructed him upon all points that occurred to us, we have nothing to communicate to you except to instruct you to return here as soon as you can, which we do herewith. Before leaving, you will give full information to the ambassador of all that you have done during your stay at court.

Bene valete!

Ex PALATIO FLORENTINO, 12 Dece

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In my view, the crux of the mission for Machiavelli came about in late August 1500, with Letter XII: “Well-digested letters or arguments will [not] be of service…. They are not cven listened to. It is idle to recall… here the good faith with which our republic has always acted… the large sums of money which we have spent… the dangers we have borne on… the ruinous damage which our republic suffered in consequence; or what his Majesty might still count upon from you if you were strong…. They are blinded by their power and their immediate advantage, and have considcration only for those who are either well armed, or who are prepared to pay…”

Political maneuvering, intelligence-gathering, and realpolitik combine for a Machiavelli out of his depth, without sufficient instruction or knowledge, and too low-class to be able to actually be viewed by the French aristocrats who surround King Louis with anything other than contempt. His city-statem Florence, which he loves, is trapped between France, Spain, the Papal States with their corrupt Pope Alexander VI and his psychopathic son Cesare Borgia, the Holy Roman Empire, and occasional Italian states (Venice, Milan, Naples) sometimes able to affect affairs—all vying for dominance in Italy. The French alliance is Florence’s only hope. And yet it is extraordinarily fragile, requiring major and constant diplomatic maintenance.

But Machiavelli does not have the tools to properly undertake that.

So he is reduced to not negotiating, but rather surveillance and strategic reconnaissance. Machiavelli reporst on the movements of armies, the moods of influential courtiers, and the unspoken intentions of foreign ambassadors, treating each encounter as a potential source of insight. Machiavelli’s intelligence work includes psychological profiling. He attributes policy decisions to the personal psychological dispositions of King Louis, Cardinal d’Amboise, and others: individual temperaments can and do shape the fate of states.

One of Machiavelli’s near-constant underlying themes is the structural difference between France and Italy. The centralized authority of the French monarchy contrasts with the fragmented and chaotic internal infighting within Italian states. Louis XII is a ruler whose predecessors have consolidated power. He is aided by loyal ministers and a structured legal system. He has a semi-efficient bureaucracy. And he seeks to burnish and solidify his authority by, while wielding near-autocratic power, striving to appear just and lawful, maintaining a balance between authority and popularity.

But when the chips are down, although popularity makes things much easier, it is not sufficient.

For one of Machiavelli’s other underlying major theme is, as Mao Zedong said, that ultimately political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

Machiavelli laments Florence’s weak military position. Machiavelli laments its unstable alliances—especially with the French. Machiavelli envies France's use of national troops rather than mercenaries—people whose nationalism and whose honor are motivators, as worth more than money. For ultimately military self-sufficiency is the closest thing to a guarantor of political independence.

Ultimately, Machiavelli’s 28 letters over five months read like dispatches from a slow-motion disaster. Court politics, fear of plague, and logistical snafus delayed them from even reaching the king. Florence’s own higher-rank ambassadors abandoned them. Cardinal d’Amboise, the king’s fixer, turns out not to be the reliable ally that the Florentine Signoria had vainly imagined him. And Louis XII, often polite, pressed him over and over again for plans and commitments they weren’t authorized to give.

Over time, we can see Machiavelli’s tone harden. Well-crafted arguments, moral appeals, and good intentions are, he finds, worth less and less in a world in which French King Louis XII Bourbon and his aristocratic courtiers respect those not at all, aristocratic status a little, and money and muscle above all. Florence, poor and militarily impotent, is a joke—"Ser Nihilo." France’s soldiers act without discipline. French aristocrats rob Florentine merchants. The Swiss mercenaries extort from everyone. And Machiavelli, the only person whom Florence has on the spot, has no authority to negotiate, and so is forced into the role of diplomatic voyeur and Cassandra.

How much did this experience shape the bitter side of Machiavelli—the one who may have dream of creating a virtuous Res Publica Fiorentina, but ultimately found himself for a chance to be useful from Medici oligarchs, and recognized how much political power stems from legitimacy, tradition, or justice, but rather from force, discipline, and respect?

Machiavelli Mission To The Court Of France

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