Commenting on Martin Wolf: as is almost always the case, the odds are strongly in favor of Martin being right, once again; but I guess I should say more than that, shouldn't I?...
You may post the U.K.'s long-term GDP chart from the FT that shows a clear inflection in trend since Brexit. That tragic chart alone should drive home the point, at least to those who want to see -- and none so blind as those who do not want to.
I think the falling impact of labor costs on overall productivity [no longer a "cheap factory workers" royal road to manufacturing exports-led development, but also perhaps no longer a "cheap customer service workers" royal road to service exports-led development] might contribute to a lessening of productivity gaps as a driver: it still makes sense to diversify supplier networks, but fewer developing countries will be able to insert themselves into those networks.
What will change, IMO, a new coupling between trade and politics. The world will remain globalized, but less promiscuously so, and trading blocs may emerge. In other words, Martin and Brad are right--but how does China fit into this?
"The proportion of people living in the United States without authorized documents has been slowly drifting down, from 4.2% in 2006 to 3.1% today." This might be due to more a liberal and creative definition of political asylum. Most asylum seekers worldwide are actually economic migrants. Given political instability and global warming, this trend is likely to continue with ultimately detrimental results.
Globalization is generally a positive sum game, but it is very tempting to defect, at least here and there, in hope of gaining outsized political and economic power. You can view the OPEC crises of 1973 and 1979 through that lens. Everyone was coming out ahead with cheap oil from a limited list of exporters, but once those exporters realized that they could defect and increase their pricing power, it placed the entire game at risk.
If everyone enjoys a poker night, it helps if they are all matched players. If someone is too good at the game, everyone suffers, and that eventually includes the ringer.
"Hyperglobalizacion": Of course the container ship and the fiber optic cable were necessary, but fundamental was China's decision to join the world economy. THAT was the key trade liberalization policy change.
If there was "hyper" globalization, it came from the US fiscal policy that created huge fiscal deficits and higher interest rates that attracted a dollar-ovevaluing, goods trade deficits-inducing capital surplus.
You may post the U.K.'s long-term GDP chart from the FT that shows a clear inflection in trend since Brexit. That tragic chart alone should drive home the point, at least to those who want to see -- and none so blind as those who do not want to.
I think the falling impact of labor costs on overall productivity [no longer a "cheap factory workers" royal road to manufacturing exports-led development, but also perhaps no longer a "cheap customer service workers" royal road to service exports-led development] might contribute to a lessening of productivity gaps as a driver: it still makes sense to diversify supplier networks, but fewer developing countries will be able to insert themselves into those networks.
Martin Wolf is right again and great. Why is he still working for FT? Ditto for Krugman at NYT.
We all have to make a living, see Noah on X, But by a certain age, one hopes you've paid off your mortgage.
What will change, IMO, a new coupling between trade and politics. The world will remain globalized, but less promiscuously so, and trading blocs may emerge. In other words, Martin and Brad are right--but how does China fit into this?
"The proportion of people living in the United States without authorized documents has been slowly drifting down, from 4.2% in 2006 to 3.1% today." This might be due to more a liberal and creative definition of political asylum. Most asylum seekers worldwide are actually economic migrants. Given political instability and global warming, this trend is likely to continue with ultimately detrimental results.
Globalization is generally a positive sum game, but it is very tempting to defect, at least here and there, in hope of gaining outsized political and economic power. You can view the OPEC crises of 1973 and 1979 through that lens. Everyone was coming out ahead with cheap oil from a limited list of exporters, but once those exporters realized that they could defect and increase their pricing power, it placed the entire game at risk.
If everyone enjoys a poker night, it helps if they are all matched players. If someone is too good at the game, everyone suffers, and that eventually includes the ringer.
"Hyperglobalizacion": Of course the container ship and the fiber optic cable were necessary, but fundamental was China's decision to join the world economy. THAT was the key trade liberalization policy change.
If there was "hyper" globalization, it came from the US fiscal policy that created huge fiscal deficits and higher interest rates that attracted a dollar-ovevaluing, goods trade deficits-inducing capital surplus.
Yep! unlike Brexit, links haven't been severed, only rearranged some.