& BRIEFLY NOTED: For 2022-02-28 Mo:The tactical dance of professional modern warfare. Attackers creeping forward in small mutually-supporting combined-arms on the ground, and defenders dancing backward, abandoning each position just before attacking artillery registers on it. And in the air above are the eggshells-armed-with-hammers that must rely on their own speed and on the suppression of enemy fire to stay alive themselves. Things get even worse for the attackers when they move from the countryside into the city. For the defender in the city, the key skill is figuring out when it is time to bug out through the hole in the back of your current building and move to the next one. For the attacker in the city, the keys are… well, there are very, very few good keys. All of this is well known, and it makes modern warfare a matter for professionals. All of which is prelude to the question: Just what the hell does the Red Army think it is doing in the Ukraine?
It's great to see you quoting Matt Levine. He does a good job of explaining the world of finance and he can be very funny.
May I recommend Angry Staff Officer. It's a mix of modern military, military history and science fiction fan service. There's a good article there comparing Afghanistan, not to Vietnam, but to China, and an interesting article on the return of large scale operations to US military thinking. I'm waiting for their take on the Ukraine.
Last year, I was reading up on the origin of multicellular organisms, and it appears that in some simple cases it involves certain cells of an organism using already existing bad news cell shutdown signals to keep neighboring cells from reproducing. In exchange for not dividing, they reap the benefits of being in a larger organism. It might even make sense for a cell to specialize and rely on nearby cells for certain functions. Since all of the cells are close relatives, cheating usually isn't worth it. It's not a prisoner's dilemma so much as a shield bearing soldier's dilemma in which dropping one's shield would endanger oneself and the entire line.
Much of it seems more prosaic and pedestrian than anything to do with artillery and technology; in many cases, it looks like they drove their tanks until they ran out of gas, and then they abandoned them. Communications and resupplies seem interrupted or nonexistent. You can’t do much with a T-90 and no fuel except get burned to death when someone shoots it with their endless supply of anti-tank weapons. So you’re not going to stick around.
But yeah, there does not seem to be any strategy in evidence.
I get the impression that Putin was going for a blitzkrieg take over with rapidly moving tank columns backed up by air cover. That worked really well, even against the USSR, back in the 1930s, but it has its limits. Running out of gas, as you have noted, being an important one.
During the Cold War, the Soviet military was often noted for its relatively inflexible command and control. Everything was done by the tactical playbook and field improvisation was discouraged. One of the reasons the tsar freed the serfs was that serfs make poor soldiers in modern wars. Russian soldiers are not serfs, but military doctrine and officer attitudes change slowly.
I've been trying to get some insight from the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia backed the former with tanks, artillery and other equipment. Turkey backed the latter with drones and missiles. Azerbaijan won, destroying a lot of equipment in the process. Still, one can only learn so much from a proxy war, and the lesson of Chechnya is still out there.
Yeah, I think if they just flatten the cities m, as in Chechnya, they can “win”. Not much of a win. Then they fight an insurgency openly backed by the entire EU and NATO, who seem content to supply any amount of equipment provided there are Ukrainians left to use it.
Pretty sure that's from Matt Levine, not "David". At least, going by the Money Stuff newsletter in my in box.
It's great to see you quoting Matt Levine. He does a good job of explaining the world of finance and he can be very funny.
May I recommend Angry Staff Officer. It's a mix of modern military, military history and science fiction fan service. There's a good article there comparing Afghanistan, not to Vietnam, but to China, and an interesting article on the return of large scale operations to US military thinking. I'm waiting for their take on the Ukraine.
Last year, I was reading up on the origin of multicellular organisms, and it appears that in some simple cases it involves certain cells of an organism using already existing bad news cell shutdown signals to keep neighboring cells from reproducing. In exchange for not dividing, they reap the benefits of being in a larger organism. It might even make sense for a cell to specialize and rely on nearby cells for certain functions. Since all of the cells are close relatives, cheating usually isn't worth it. It's not a prisoner's dilemma so much as a shield bearing soldier's dilemma in which dropping one's shield would endanger oneself and the entire line.
More than a shieldΩ—a shield, and your nearest neighbor is a copy of your set...
Much of it seems more prosaic and pedestrian than anything to do with artillery and technology; in many cases, it looks like they drove their tanks until they ran out of gas, and then they abandoned them. Communications and resupplies seem interrupted or nonexistent. You can’t do much with a T-90 and no fuel except get burned to death when someone shoots it with their endless supply of anti-tank weapons. So you’re not going to stick around.
But yeah, there does not seem to be any strategy in evidence.
I get the impression that Putin was going for a blitzkrieg take over with rapidly moving tank columns backed up by air cover. That worked really well, even against the USSR, back in the 1930s, but it has its limits. Running out of gas, as you have noted, being an important one.
During the Cold War, the Soviet military was often noted for its relatively inflexible command and control. Everything was done by the tactical playbook and field improvisation was discouraged. One of the reasons the tsar freed the serfs was that serfs make poor soldiers in modern wars. Russian soldiers are not serfs, but military doctrine and officer attitudes change slowly.
I've been trying to get some insight from the recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia backed the former with tanks, artillery and other equipment. Turkey backed the latter with drones and missiles. Azerbaijan won, destroying a lot of equipment in the process. Still, one can only learn so much from a proxy war, and the lesson of Chechnya is still out there.
Yeah, I think if they just flatten the cities m, as in Chechnya, they can “win”. Not much of a win. Then they fight an insurgency openly backed by the entire EU and NATO, who seem content to supply any amount of equipment provided there are Ukrainians left to use it.
n-grams
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=the+environment%2Cenvironmental%2Can+environment%2C+ecology&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=3&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cthe%20environment%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Cenvironmental%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Can%20environment%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Cecology%3B%2Cc0
Maybe start with "* environment" to get a sense of the more frequent contexts.
Cf.
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=energy&year_start=1500&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=3&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cenergy%3B%2Cc0
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=gravity&year_start=1500&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=3
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=intoxication&year_start=1500&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=3&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cintoxication%3B%2Cc0
interesting...