I don't think you need to be quite so defensive about the economic status of the English working class in 1870. Their diet may have been "better" than in previous periods - a claim which I think will still depend on the exact historical period you single out for comparison - but it was still pitifully meagre by modern standards. In fact, we can still see that quite clearly more than a generation later in the heights and weights of British soldiers recruited during WWI. The temperance movement was animated to a considerable extent by the concern that by drinking a pint or two of beer, the working man would thereby starve his family of vital calories that day.
Note Mills' use of the term "middle classes", which refers not to a middle demographic as it does in modern America - say the middle 3/4 of the population by income - but to a middling wealth or income status. A "middle class" person was able to employ servants and could weather a few years without income, if needs be. I believe the term retained this meaning in Britain right up to the 2nd World War.
Yes! on British soldiers, that issue goes all the way back to the 1880s. The 1883 Anthropometric Committee of the British Association of the Advancement of Science, under Charles Roberts and Sir Francis Galton, had reported that working class 14-year old boys were about 5-6 inches shorter than the ones from upper classes (though there were some sampling issues in that report). There was much concern at that time about the state of the working classes (a source of recruits). During the Boer War, for example, the Inspector General of recruiting had noted that about 40% of those willing to join the army were deemed unfit. Some of these cohorts were born and brought up in the the mid-19th century when average adult stature was shrinking. But you are probably right when you say that just about everything in terms of health or living standards then was dismal compared to the recent modern times. Also, there is usually a temptation to ride on the term "Industrial Revolution" -- a term historians use for the late 18th century through much of the 19th century -- and then expect, logically, that life might have improved; it was a revolution, after all. But one is usually disappointed to find otherwise, even a worsening by some measures, before Brad's hinge of history circa 1870/1880. These may have to do with some of the issues Brad highlights in Slouching (e.g. distributional issues such as access to public health, pollution, even the franchise back then etc.) that still flummox us (as Brad would put it).
You might be able to identify some thing I vaguely remember. In Britain when they were recruiting for [late 19th century war] they were shocked that the average height of the recruits was lower than when they were recruiting for [previous late 19th century war]. This led to the start of laws about public health and welfare to make the lives of the poor slightly less horrible.
There were quite of few major public health acts in the 1860s/1870s, especially after the big cholera epidemics. During this time, the franchise was broadened too, though still far from 100%, for women couldn't vote. I don't know if the adult heights of recruits had directly motivated public health legislation.
"John Stuart Mill’s claim—that even as late as 1871 the Industrial Revolution had not yet really begun to matter very much—may well strike you as surprising, even bizarre."
He was probably right. The range of life expectancy at birth (about 27-40 yrs) in the 19th century wasn't that much different from the range in prior centuries (e.g. 1581: 41.7 yrs, 1871: 40.7 yrs). In the data from the Human Mortality database, life expectancies at ages 15 and 20 in 1871 were close to where they were in 1841 (roughly 40-45 yrs range). Stature at adulthood was terrible, even shrinking for successive birth cohorts born toward the middle of the 19th century. Reported death rates of both infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases were high, with infectious diseases accounting for about half the total deaths. Epidemics, even pandemics, were frequent. If you combine Britain and Ireland, there were 17 major epidemic outbreaks during (1801-50), about the same frequency as (1701-50), followed by 8 major outbreaks during (1851-1900), including those well known cholera outbreaks. You probably don't need to cite real wage rates to communicate that life wasn't pretty for average folk. And even if real wages were rising some, so what? Life was likely miserable right up to the hinge, and Mill was likely an astute observer even though he doesn't cite any data.
While the invention of devices is significant, I wonder if more attention shouldn't be paid to the invention, or adoption, of methods for managing those devices or accounting for the value of their use. For instance, Andrew Carnegie's adoption of continuous "cost accounting" in his steel mills, or J.P. Morgan's "Morganization" of the US railway industry that included a shift to valuing enterprises based on their expected future earnings rather than on their paid-in capital or par value.
These non-material innovations seem to have had just as much, or more, impact as the invention of any particular machine or device.
I see that the attention to the industrialization of research and innovation is getting even less shrift as you compress the transition to the first exponential growth economy. It was unfortunate that much of it was left on the cutting room floor in your book. But what is known about the differences in the ways in which the early steam-powered technologies (and the telegraph) moved from invention to world-wide dispersion before and after 1870? I can't believe that Edison invented the industrial laboratory out of whole cloth. Who were the demi- or even hemi-demi Edisons?
I don't think you need to be quite so defensive about the economic status of the English working class in 1870. Their diet may have been "better" than in previous periods - a claim which I think will still depend on the exact historical period you single out for comparison - but it was still pitifully meagre by modern standards. In fact, we can still see that quite clearly more than a generation later in the heights and weights of British soldiers recruited during WWI. The temperance movement was animated to a considerable extent by the concern that by drinking a pint or two of beer, the working man would thereby starve his family of vital calories that day.
Note Mills' use of the term "middle classes", which refers not to a middle demographic as it does in modern America - say the middle 3/4 of the population by income - but to a middling wealth or income status. A "middle class" person was able to employ servants and could weather a few years without income, if needs be. I believe the term retained this meaning in Britain right up to the 2nd World War.
Thx... The term "middle class" should he banned.... "Middling class" only...
Yes! on British soldiers, that issue goes all the way back to the 1880s. The 1883 Anthropometric Committee of the British Association of the Advancement of Science, under Charles Roberts and Sir Francis Galton, had reported that working class 14-year old boys were about 5-6 inches shorter than the ones from upper classes (though there were some sampling issues in that report). There was much concern at that time about the state of the working classes (a source of recruits). During the Boer War, for example, the Inspector General of recruiting had noted that about 40% of those willing to join the army were deemed unfit. Some of these cohorts were born and brought up in the the mid-19th century when average adult stature was shrinking. But you are probably right when you say that just about everything in terms of health or living standards then was dismal compared to the recent modern times. Also, there is usually a temptation to ride on the term "Industrial Revolution" -- a term historians use for the late 18th century through much of the 19th century -- and then expect, logically, that life might have improved; it was a revolution, after all. But one is usually disappointed to find otherwise, even a worsening by some measures, before Brad's hinge of history circa 1870/1880. These may have to do with some of the issues Brad highlights in Slouching (e.g. distributional issues such as access to public health, pollution, even the franchise back then etc.) that still flummox us (as Brad would put it).
You might be able to identify some thing I vaguely remember. In Britain when they were recruiting for [late 19th century war] they were shocked that the average height of the recruits was lower than when they were recruiting for [previous late 19th century war]. This led to the start of laws about public health and welfare to make the lives of the poor slightly less horrible.
Was this actually a thing?
There were quite of few major public health acts in the 1860s/1870s, especially after the big cholera epidemics. During this time, the franchise was broadened too, though still far from 100%, for women couldn't vote. I don't know if the adult heights of recruits had directly motivated public health legislation.
"John Stuart Mill’s claim—that even as late as 1871 the Industrial Revolution had not yet really begun to matter very much—may well strike you as surprising, even bizarre."
He was probably right. The range of life expectancy at birth (about 27-40 yrs) in the 19th century wasn't that much different from the range in prior centuries (e.g. 1581: 41.7 yrs, 1871: 40.7 yrs). In the data from the Human Mortality database, life expectancies at ages 15 and 20 in 1871 were close to where they were in 1841 (roughly 40-45 yrs range). Stature at adulthood was terrible, even shrinking for successive birth cohorts born toward the middle of the 19th century. Reported death rates of both infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases were high, with infectious diseases accounting for about half the total deaths. Epidemics, even pandemics, were frequent. If you combine Britain and Ireland, there were 17 major epidemic outbreaks during (1801-50), about the same frequency as (1701-50), followed by 8 major outbreaks during (1851-1900), including those well known cholera outbreaks. You probably don't need to cite real wage rates to communicate that life wasn't pretty for average folk. And even if real wages were rising some, so what? Life was likely miserable right up to the hinge, and Mill was likely an astute observer even though he doesn't cite any data.
Irrelevance: I can't read of J S Mill's magnum opus without recalling the famous clerihew:
John Stuart Mill,
by a mighty effort of will,
overcame his natural bonhomie,
and wrote Principles of Political Economy.
While the invention of devices is significant, I wonder if more attention shouldn't be paid to the invention, or adoption, of methods for managing those devices or accounting for the value of their use. For instance, Andrew Carnegie's adoption of continuous "cost accounting" in his steel mills, or J.P. Morgan's "Morganization" of the US railway industry that included a shift to valuing enterprises based on their expected future earnings rather than on their paid-in capital or par value.
These non-material innovations seem to have had just as much, or more, impact as the invention of any particular machine or device.
Probably. The invention of management and control is a very important and crucial sub-piece of the invention of the corporation...
I see that the attention to the industrialization of research and innovation is getting even less shrift as you compress the transition to the first exponential growth economy. It was unfortunate that much of it was left on the cutting room floor in your book. But what is known about the differences in the ways in which the early steam-powered technologies (and the telegraph) moved from invention to world-wide dispersion before and after 1870? I can't believe that Edison invented the industrial laboratory out of whole cloth. Who were the demi- or even hemi-demi Edisons?