"So whose informed view on all of this should I borrow?"
Bret Devereaux's, of course. Devereaux points out (https://acoup.blog/2022/02/25/miscellanea-understanding-the-war-in-ukraine/) that direct intervention by NATO is a very very very bad idea because of the high risk of a mistaken apprehension by Russia of a nuclear attack and consequently a nuclear response.
On the other hand, NATO can absolutely crush Russia economically if it has the will to suffer the temporary economic disruption that will be caused by being deprived of Russian hydrocarbons. And given that this deprivation is Putin's logical escalation, it is deeply stupid not to get ahead of the game and seize the moral high ground. It's not like we're going to have to make the same sacrifices that Ukrainians are making.
It seems pretty clear that unless perhaps Putin starts on mass murders in the streets, neither NATO nor the EU is going to directly engage in Ukraine. And as long as there are still Ukrainians willing to fight with weapons shipped through Romania and Poland, why would they? And if there aren’t any left, why would NATO get involved? So his point is moot anyway.
I agree with Nichols at least on this: the best hope is that Ukraine holds out long enough that the Russian conscripts notice that they don’t seem to be in the midst of a hated Nazi dictatorship but rather among Russian-speaking Orthodox Slavs who are very pissed off with them.
I haven’t seen any analysis that anyone with a NYT subscription and a swift scan through Twitter and Reddit couldn’t come up with themselves: this was somewhat half-assed, Russia will still probably prevail, bloodily, and nobody can say whether and for how long there will be an insurgency, or how it will work out for Putin. It is a very strange decision, for sure.
Curious whether this Ukrainian episode is the new benchmark to close the long 20th Century, or whether it reopens the count. Maybe that depends on what this means for globalized trade?
"So whose informed view on all of this should I borrow?"
Bret Devereaux's, of course. Devereaux points out (https://acoup.blog/2022/02/25/miscellanea-understanding-the-war-in-ukraine/) that direct intervention by NATO is a very very very bad idea because of the high risk of a mistaken apprehension by Russia of a nuclear attack and consequently a nuclear response.
On the other hand, NATO can absolutely crush Russia economically if it has the will to suffer the temporary economic disruption that will be caused by being deprived of Russian hydrocarbons. And given that this deprivation is Putin's logical escalation, it is deeply stupid not to get ahead of the game and seize the moral high ground. It's not like we're going to have to make the same sacrifices that Ukrainians are making.
It seems pretty clear that unless perhaps Putin starts on mass murders in the streets, neither NATO nor the EU is going to directly engage in Ukraine. And as long as there are still Ukrainians willing to fight with weapons shipped through Romania and Poland, why would they? And if there aren’t any left, why would NATO get involved? So his point is moot anyway.
I agree with Nichols at least on this: the best hope is that Ukraine holds out long enough that the Russian conscripts notice that they don’t seem to be in the midst of a hated Nazi dictatorship but rather among Russian-speaking Orthodox Slavs who are very pissed off with them.
I haven’t seen any analysis that anyone with a NYT subscription and a swift scan through Twitter and Reddit couldn’t come up with themselves: this was somewhat half-assed, Russia will still probably prevail, bloodily, and nobody can say whether and for how long there will be an insurgency, or how it will work out for Putin. It is a very strange decision, for sure.
Curious whether this Ukrainian episode is the new benchmark to close the long 20th Century, or whether it reopens the count. Maybe that depends on what this means for globalized trade?