Not thinking about Ukraine this morning... A very nice piece from Rafael Guthmann. But I do have a quibble: I think it unwise to call these pre-1750 régimes “non-Malthusian” in any profound sense. Our economic growth since 1870, and to some degree over 1770 to 1870, comes from breaking the Malthusian link between prosperity and population growth, first partially and now completely—the demographic transition and the rise of modern feminism, and the creation of a society in which durable female social power does not rely near-completely upon being the mother of surviving sons—and from the extraordinary waves of technological development. But previous “efflorescences”, in Jack Goldstone’s word, up to 1750 (and their inverse: collapses and dark ages) rely not on shifts in the technology growth rate h and feminist social revolutions, but instead on sociology, economics, and politics that produce durable alterations in '“subsistence” necessities consumption y^sub, the '“taste” for “luxuries” φ, and the creation and maintenance of imperial peace and other “inclusive” institutions that drive large shifts in s. Plus we then have the dynamics of convergence to a society’s Malthusian equilibrium from an initial state off of the equilibrium path.
That is obviously an economist's point of view, not a historians.
Historians have long noted a long term growth trend in European history. There were all sorts of innovations over the centuries: chimneys for heating, better plows on the Chinese model, shock absorbers for coaches, improved water wheels, better designed harnesses, flax culture and more effective yokes for animals. These led to an overall improvement in living standards and economic output. Advances rarely came alone. The introduction of the mechanical clock also marked a general improvements in making machinery which had further downstream effects.
Historians, particular those studying Europe, have noted a roughly two century cycle of economic expansion and contraction with the expansion associated with low but rising costs of food, fuel and rent and the contraction with extremely high costs of food, fuel and rent. These have been ascribed to Malthusian factors with the ratio of resources to population being an important driving factor of prices. There is also a cycle of urbanization. There are times when it is too dangerous to live far from a fortified urban center and more vulnerable farms are abandoned.
My feeling is that isn't really correct to call our current industrial regime non-Malthusian. We are much better at increasing productivity, industrial and agricultural, and much better at getting more efficient in our use of resources, but we are still resource limited. As Dyson pointed out, we are limited by the resources available to us as planets and lesser bodies in solar orbit and the energy output of our sun. At some extreme, we could rebuild our world as an optimal sphere, but then we'd hit a limit unless we were able to exploit other stars and their collections of miscellaneous matter.
It's not hard to imagine a world with ten billion people. It would look much like our current world but with more restrictions, fewer natural areas and a technology slightly more advanced than at present. If we consider a world with one hundred billion people, it quickly becomes obvious that such a world would require much more advanced technology and look quite different from the present. Current estimates of human use of the net planetary product run in the range of 20% to 50%, so increasing the population from 10^10 to 10^11 would require some major breakthroughs with regards to energy, water and agriculture and, at least during the transition stage, would entail rising prices for land, food and fuel much in the manner of earlier possibly Malthusian cycles.
We are already seeing Malthusian push back with regards to resources. Look at our periodic energy crises. Look at the more frequent conflicts with regards to harnessing fresh water sources. Look at the challenge of the Second Green Revolution and contemplate the likely necessary Third, Fourth, Fifth and so on. Whether you accept that humans are the cause of global warming and drying or not, there is still the fact of global warming and drying to deal with, and expecting that problem to just go away is not a realistic strategy.
We did have a major breakthrough with the Industrial Revolution, and it is likely the Romans had a similar major breakthrough that enabled their empire. We are either going to have to accept our Malthusian limits at some point or we are going to need another breakthrough, one that dwarfs that of the Industrial Revolution.
But (a) the increase in worldwide population from -1000 to 150 was only four-fold, and (b) that was enough—in smaller farm sizes—to exhaust the technology, in the sense of there being little or no increase in typical working-class standards of living...
I agree that the modern industrial revolution has dramatically pushed out the Malthusian envelope, but there is still an envelope. Even the residents of a perfect Dyson sphere face a limit though that may be far beyond the limit of any planetary civilization.
If you model long term growth with a first order exponential equation, you are going to get a solution that adds up a lot of e^(ax+b)'s. Those exponents have a real part, the growth or decay, and an imaginary part, the oscillations. If you are familiar with, for example, the heat equation, there is no surprise that there is an overall trend expanding the envelope and a lot of ups and downs as one can add up imaginary powers of e into any shape one wishes. Sometimes, I wish my limited knowledge of differential equations permitted me to be more of an optimist.
Well, yes, eventually things are going to logisticize somewhere, but where? Appealing to the principle of mediocrity does not get us very far at all...
I think you are arguing that, in the short term, the Great Depression and WWII were "Malthusian." It's easier, I think, to simply acknowledge that social technologies (which may regress) have a significance comparable to hard technologies, which seldom regress.
I like that, an appeal to mediocrity. (I had a roommate say that his tennis playing was fair with flashes of mediocrity.)
That is obviously an economist's point of view, not a historians.
Historians have long noted a long term growth trend in European history. There were all sorts of innovations over the centuries: chimneys for heating, better plows on the Chinese model, shock absorbers for coaches, improved water wheels, better designed harnesses, flax culture and more effective yokes for animals. These led to an overall improvement in living standards and economic output. Advances rarely came alone. The introduction of the mechanical clock also marked a general improvements in making machinery which had further downstream effects.
Historians, particular those studying Europe, have noted a roughly two century cycle of economic expansion and contraction with the expansion associated with low but rising costs of food, fuel and rent and the contraction with extremely high costs of food, fuel and rent. These have been ascribed to Malthusian factors with the ratio of resources to population being an important driving factor of prices. There is also a cycle of urbanization. There are times when it is too dangerous to live far from a fortified urban center and more vulnerable farms are abandoned.
My feeling is that isn't really correct to call our current industrial regime non-Malthusian. We are much better at increasing productivity, industrial and agricultural, and much better at getting more efficient in our use of resources, but we are still resource limited. As Dyson pointed out, we are limited by the resources available to us as planets and lesser bodies in solar orbit and the energy output of our sun. At some extreme, we could rebuild our world as an optimal sphere, but then we'd hit a limit unless we were able to exploit other stars and their collections of miscellaneous matter.
It's not hard to imagine a world with ten billion people. It would look much like our current world but with more restrictions, fewer natural areas and a technology slightly more advanced than at present. If we consider a world with one hundred billion people, it quickly becomes obvious that such a world would require much more advanced technology and look quite different from the present. Current estimates of human use of the net planetary product run in the range of 20% to 50%, so increasing the population from 10^10 to 10^11 would require some major breakthroughs with regards to energy, water and agriculture and, at least during the transition stage, would entail rising prices for land, food and fuel much in the manner of earlier possibly Malthusian cycles.
We are already seeing Malthusian push back with regards to resources. Look at our periodic energy crises. Look at the more frequent conflicts with regards to harnessing fresh water sources. Look at the challenge of the Second Green Revolution and contemplate the likely necessary Third, Fourth, Fifth and so on. Whether you accept that humans are the cause of global warming and drying or not, there is still the fact of global warming and drying to deal with, and expecting that problem to just go away is not a realistic strategy.
We did have a major breakthrough with the Industrial Revolution, and it is likely the Romans had a similar major breakthrough that enabled their empire. We are either going to have to accept our Malthusian limits at some point or we are going to need another breakthrough, one that dwarfs that of the Industrial Revolution.
But (a) the increase in worldwide population from -1000 to 150 was only four-fold, and (b) that was enough—in smaller farm sizes—to exhaust the technology, in the sense of there being little or no increase in typical working-class standards of living...
I agree that the modern industrial revolution has dramatically pushed out the Malthusian envelope, but there is still an envelope. Even the residents of a perfect Dyson sphere face a limit though that may be far beyond the limit of any planetary civilization.
If you model long term growth with a first order exponential equation, you are going to get a solution that adds up a lot of e^(ax+b)'s. Those exponents have a real part, the growth or decay, and an imaginary part, the oscillations. If you are familiar with, for example, the heat equation, there is no surprise that there is an overall trend expanding the envelope and a lot of ups and downs as one can add up imaginary powers of e into any shape one wishes. Sometimes, I wish my limited knowledge of differential equations permitted me to be more of an optimist.
Well, yes, eventually things are going to logisticize somewhere, but where? Appealing to the principle of mediocrity does not get us very far at all...
I think you are arguing that, in the short term, the Great Depression and WWII were "Malthusian." It's easier, I think, to simply acknowledge that social technologies (which may regress) have a significance comparable to hard technologies, which seldom regress.